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I am grateful for, and honored by, the papers by David Alvarez, David 
Lefkowitz, and Michael Blake on my recent work on the legitimacy of 
international institutions.  
I will give a brief introduction to some of the main ideas of the project 
before I respond to the criticisms. The basic project is animated by two 
basic concerns. The first concern is to try to devise a normative conception 
of the international political system under the guidance of cosmopolitan 
and democratic principles. The second is to see how far we can go in 
realizing cosmopolitan and democratic principles in the international 
political community while recognizing the centrality of states and the 
necessity of state consent to the legitimation of the international political 
community. The corollary to this project is to ask what kinds of 
modifications of the contemporary system of state consent would be 
necessary to realize the democratic and cosmopolitan concerns. What 
would a system of state consent have to look like in order for it to realize 
cosmopolitan and democratic ideals? What changes would have to be 
made relative to the one that we already see present.  
For many people, this project seems doomed from the start if not 
outright incoherent. Many might ask, how can a theory that is devoted to 
cosmopolitan and democratic aims be compatible with a theory that says 
that states ought to play a central role in international decision making? 
Surely we need to have global political institutions that are democratically 
organized in a way that is analogous to the democratic organization of 
modern states. To be sure, there are many flaws in these democratic states 
and they must be overcome, but some form of centralized collective 
decision making in which all adult persons can participate as equals is 
required to satisfy the cosmopolitan and democratic concern. And some of 
the criticisms offered in the papers suggest this.  
But I am not convinced that the project is incoherent and so I will lay 
out some of the reasons for engaging in this project and give a sketch of 
how I think the project must go. Just as a quick response, it is not obvious 
why a system that relies on a qualified requirement of voluntary agreement 
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among a small number of groups is inherently disabled from making 
decisions in an egalitarian way that are designed to advance the common 
good among all the members of those groups. 
As I understand it, a political community is essentially constituted by 
three basic facts: one, there is a set of morally mandatory aims that each 
member has reason to see, and mostly does see, must be pursued through 
the cooperation of the members of the community. Two, though there are 
commonly accepted mandatory aims, there is substantial disagreement 
about how to specify the aims and how to pursue those mandatory aims 
effectively and fairly. Three, there is also a substantial diversity of interests 
with regard to how to pursue those aims. As a consequence of these facts, 
a community must have some kind of decision process by which to 
negotiate the disagreements and conflicts of interests in choosing how to 
cooperate in realizing the aims.  
I characterize the position that I am defending as a kind of progressive 
cosmopolitanism. What this means is that there is a cosmopolitan political 
community but that its aims are limited initially to what can be taken to be 
reasonable aims for the community. The progressive element is that as the 
community becomes capable of achieving the aims to some significant 
degree, the aims become more demanding over time. Modern states 
pursue at the moment the most ambitious aims political communities can 
pursue, which are public justice and the common good. This involves basic 
liberties, distributive justice, retributive justice, a highly integrated system 
of economic activities constrained by considerations of fairness and 
efficiency, as well as basic public goods such as education and pollution 
control. The international political system is much less ambitious. It 
pursues international peace and security, the protection of persons from 
the most serious human rights violations, the avoidance of global 
environmental disaster, the alleviation of severe global poverty, and a 
decent system of international trade and finance. The vast majority of 
states have signed on to each one of these aims and it is generally recognized 
that cooperation among states is necessary to achieve these aims. But 
relative to the aims pursued internally by states, these aims are modest. 
My thought is that once we can fulfill these aims reasonably well, more 
fine grained aims will become important for the international community. 
The more refined the aims become, the more like the aims that states 
pursue, the more pressure there will be to make the international 
community more like a state. The more the international community 
becomes like a state the more it takes over the functions that states have 
fulfilled. But this is pretty far off still.  
4 Christiano.indd   222 21/4/17   13:31
 Replies to David Álvarez, David lefkowitz and Michael Blake 223
LEAP 4 (2016)
For the moment we have states as by far and away the most capable and 
the most accountable institutions in the international system. The reasons 
for staying with states for the time being as the building blocks of the 
international order, at this relatively early stage in the development of 
international institutions, are three: one, states are still by far the most 
effective systems for making power accountable to persons in the 
international system. Many have developed egalitarian practices of 
accountability over the last five hundred years and have achieved a great 
deal in this respect. Admittedly, the modern democratic state leaves much 
to be desired in terms of basic democratic norms and economic justice, yet 
it is a great achievement all the same; it ought to be preserved as long as we 
have little else to replace it with.  
Second states are highly integrated systems for achieving justice and 
the common good that have developed over long periods of time. The 
integrity of the system of rights and justice and the democratic system by 
which this is preserved is complex. The social conditions that have arisen 
for sustaining this integrated system have taken a long time to develop and 
are essential to the proper functioning of the institution. We can look at the 
world as a whole as a geographically determined division of labor in which 
the basic interests and rights of persons are advanced in geographically 
defined areas by institutions that are highly accountable to the persons in 
them. This division of labor is highly imperfect, and in some places works 
hardly at all, but it is still the best we have for advancing the interests of 
persons. And we can see that, I think, from a morally cosmopolitan 
standpoint. We do not want to do violence to the integrity of states at this 
point, since that is likely to damage their capacities to carry out the basic 
functions they perform. Hence we want international law and institutions 
to be compatible with the states and for that reason we want a qualified 
requirement of consent to those institutions or laws before states are 
obligated to comply with them, at least at the most fundamental level.  
Furthermore, third, these states are in a position to represent their 
members to the larger community. Because of the development of 
democratic accountability they not only are capable of making the internal 
systems responsive to the interests of their members, they are also capable 
of making their contributions to the larger world responsive to the 
members. The development of democratic institutions over the past 
century or so is a hard won and very difficult achievement that must not be 
tossed out. The development of international institutions and law must 
make use of these democratic institutions in order to give those institutions 
democratic legitimacy. To be sure, as David Alvarez rightly notes, the 
citizenry in most of these states is not yet sufficiently oriented to the 
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important roles their states play in the international system. This is a 
problem that must be rectified if we are to make progress in solving the 
global problems the modern international system must solve.
Here we have one set of reasons for thinking that the pursuit of the 
mandatory aims of the international political system ought to be through 
the mechanisms of voluntary associations of states. These are reasons for 
preferring a decentralized consent based process of decision making 
among states and not having a centralized majoritarian collective decision 
making process among states or persons across the world. Such decision 
making would threaten to breach the integrity of the states that remain 
essential elements of the division of labor. A second kind of reason has to 
do with the pursuit of mandatory aims in the international system. The 
idea is that states have a qualified immunity from having obligations 
imposed upon them that they do not consent to because it is important for 
the international community to allow a significant amount of 
experimentation in the making of international law, especially when it 
comes to the pursuit of the mandatory aims. The reason for this is that 
there is a great deal of uncertainty as to how the mandatory aims ought to 
be pursued. For example, there is a great deal of reasonable disagreement 
on how to end global poverty. It seems that under these circumstances, a 
state may in good faith refuse to enter into an agreement on the grounds 
that the arrangement is not likely to achieve the goal of lessening poverty. 
As long as the refusal is in good faith and on the basis of a reasonable 
disagreement, the refusal of consent makes the state immune to the 
imposition of obligation in this instance.  States must, however, propose 
some alternative method of resolving the problem, which is feasible in the 
circumstances. So refusal of consent is permissible and undercuts the 
imposition of an obligation.  
But the immunity is only a qualified immunity. A state may not refuse 
consent on the basis of irrational, unscrupulous, or self-defeating grounds. 
That is, if a state refuses consent on the basis of beliefs that, say, ninety-seven 
percent of well-informed scientists regard as mistaken (as in the case of 
denial of anthropogenic climate change [Anderegg, Prall, Harold and 
Schneider 2010]) the refusal ought to be treated as impermissible. In addition, 
if a state refuses consent because it wants to free ride on the efforts of others 
or simply does not want to shoulder any burdens in realizing the mandatory 
aims, or on the basis of self-defeating considerations, the refusal is to be re-
garded as impermissible. The consequence of this impermissible refusal is 
that the state in question loses its immunity from obligation and may be 
pressured, or perhaps even coerced, to join the arrangement it is not con-
senting to, depending on what is proportional and prudent in the situation.  
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The requirement of a good reason does not entail that the consideration 
offered be the correct reason but only that the consideration is one that 
reasonable persons can disagree on. Reasonable disagreement is 
disagreement that reflects an epistemically serious approach to 
understanding the issues involved in pursuing the mandatory aims and 
reflects a good faith effort to find a way to cooperate in pursuit of the 
mandatory aim.  This openness of the system to reasonable disagreement 
is one concession to the character of the international community as a 
political community. In these situations, the community of states must 
judge whether the refusal to cooperate on the part of a particular state is 
unreasonable or not. The requirement of a good reason for refusal of 
consent and the consequence of failing to give a good reason are both 
generated because the aims are morally mandatory. But these requirements 
still leave a great deal of space for states to refuse consent to arrangements 
and to remain immune to the imposition of obligations by others. We 
should expect that different rival associations of states might arise in this 
context. Regional associations and as well as competing global 
organizations may arise as a consequence of differing views about how 
best to solve a problem in pursuing a mandatory aim. To be sure, the 
requirement of reasonableness constrains here as well. When a state or 
group of states refuses to coordinate with another group on the grounds 
that they wish to establish their own distinctive international association 
and the failure of overall coordination would straightforwardly undermine 
the pursuit of the mandatory aims, this too would be unreasonable. The 
reason why is that the refusal to coordinate in this instance would be self-
defeating from the standpoint of the pursuit of mandatory aims. A 
mundane example of this kind of self-defeat would occur if a group in a 
society decided it was better to have a different set of rules of the road than 
the one that is currently in place. While it may be true that the alternative 
rules would be better were they universally adopted, they would create 
havoc were they to be only partially adopted.  In the international realm, a 
uniform and universal set of standards for determining the borders of 
states is superior to the adoption by different groups of different sets of 
standards, even if one of these would be superior to the actual one were it 
universally adopted. The confusion generated by the diversity of set of 
standards might trip the system into war.  
Here we see the significance of the mandatory aims for the international 
political system as well as the significance of reasonable disagreement on 
how to specify or pursue the mandatory aims. Here we see the importance 
of consent as well. States may refuse consent and when they do consent, 
the power to consent gives them a say over the content of the agreements 
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they enter into, which implies that the people who are ultimately subjected 
to the agreements have a say in their content. Here we have a political 
system that pursues mandatory aims but that does so in a manner that 
respects the different reasonable views of persons and that attempts to 
give people a say in the contents of agreements their societies enter into. 
Furthermore, the system respects the integrity of the most important and 
efficacious political unit in the international order, the state. But it does so 
in a way that allows progressive change through state consent and in some 
cases is open to the imposition of obligations on states when they 
unreasonably refuse consent. In this way, international law and institutions 
can acquire a basic legitimacy from the agreements of states to them 
(Christiano 2017).
There are a number of other features of this conception of legitimate 
institutions that have a cosmopolitan and democratic grounding that are 
worth discussing, such as the relation of international institutions which 
have some independence from the states that create them, but I want to 
mention one feature in particular, which is the focus of some of the papers. 
This is an implication of the democratic aspirations of the system I am 
discussing. The idea is that the process of consent and agreement making 
must be one that treats the persons as equals. The basic requirement this 
implies for state consent is a requirement of fair negotiation among states. 
It is not enough that the states’ agreements to treaties or conventions be 
voluntary in the sense that they are uncoerced and undeceived. They must 
also arise from a process of fair agreement making. This is the most 
demanding feature of the conception I am suggesting here and it is not one 
that can be fully realized.  For, on the one hand, a fair process of negotiation 
implies that states ought to have a kind of equal bargaining power in the 
process of negotiating arrangements (or at least power in proportion to 
population and major stakes). The ideal of fairness is a reasonably 
straightforward implication of the democratic ideal of persons having an 
equal say in deciding arrangements they share as it applies to a 
decentralized decision making system. On the other hand, the power of 
states in negotiating is often a function of wealth. So developing states 
normally have a significant deficit of power relative to developed states. 
And this matches the ordering of states as historically colonized or 
dominated states and colonizing or dominating states. The only way to 
rectify this fully would be to have some kind of redistribution of wealth, 
but this itself would require the creation of very ambitious international 
arrangements, which we are not in a position to realize yet. What we are 
required politically to do at the moment towards this aim is to contribute 
to the development of poor societies in pursuit of the mandatory aim of 
poverty alleviation as is required by the Millennium Development 
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Declaration. In the meantime, there may be lesser ways of neutralizing the 
power relations among wealthy and poor states. Treaties created through 
highly transparent multilateral treaty conferences may help rectify some 
of the imbalance, since, one, wealthy states prefer not to be seen as sticking 
it to the poor countries (Albin); and, two, the one source of power developing 
countries can make use of is through the creation of strong coalitions of 
countries that may be able to counter the bargaining strength that wealthy 
countries have (Narlikar and Odell). Here we might be able to learn a lesson 
from the creation of trade unions as ways of countering the relative 
bargaining strength of capital in capitalist societies. 
I want to make a brief remark about issues of feasibility here. In my view, 
in the long run, we must hope that the world will come under the jurisdiction 
of significantly more centralized democratic political institutions. Perhaps 
there will be something like a world federal state or perhaps we will have 
learned by then how to construct better institutions than states. What 
animates the search for an alternative conception of the international 
political community at the moment is a kind of feasibility constraint. The 
thought is that it would be self-defeating from the standpoint of the 
cosmopolitan concerns to try to realize a global federal state now or even 
in the next couple hundred years. Despite this, I am thinking of the view I 
am elaborating as a kind of ideal theory. And the reason why is that the 
current infeasibility of more ambitious global institutions is not based on 
an assessment of the bad moral motivations of the persons in the system. 
There is, to be sure, xenophobia, indifference to the plight of others, and 
naked self-interest among the peoples of the world. But I am not convinced 
these are the main obstacles to more ambitious global institutions. In my 
view, the obstacles are primarily informational and transactional. The 
information needed to integrate the many states of the world into a unified 
effective, accountable, and just system is enormous and currently 
overwhelming.  But this is also why the view I am espousing is progressive. 
The thought is that the obstacles to greater integration are not permanent 
ones but ones that will slowly be overcome. In the meantime, we still have 
reason to see whether there is a way that democratic and cosmopolitan 
standards can be satisfied in the decentralized system we have. I think 
they can.
With these remarks in mind, I want to discuss some of the main points 
in the three papers. I agree with David Alvarez that my account of the 
legitimacy of international institutions is missing a significant piece, 
which is necessary to a fully adequate account of legitimacy. And I am 
grateful to Alvarez for pressing me on this issue. But I am not entirely 
convinced of Alvarez’s thesis that this piece cannot be supplied for the 
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account I have offered. The problem, as he describes it, is that modern 
democratic societies are inherently biased towards the welfares of their 
own citizens and away from the welfares of non-citizens. And this bias 
makes it nearly impossible for contemporary democratic states to live up to 
their obligations to the global community. This is, of course, particularly 
the case for arrangements that may require some significant element of 
redistribution such as the alleviation of global poverty or the mitigation of 
climate change or efforts to adapt to it. It seems even to hold in the case of 
the failure of wealthy states to diminish the subsidies they give to their 
agriculture, which subsidies damage the abilities of poor countries to 
participate in international trade since agriculture is the area in which 
they have a comparative advantage. In addition, wealthy states have 
systematically fallen short of the targets they themselves have set for global 
development aid. They have tended to fall short in establishing and 
implementing carbon emissions targets. One could also add that modern 
democratic states have fallen short in their purported efforts to include 
developing countries fully in the world trading system.  
I agree with Alvarez that many developed societies have failed in these 
ways and that these failures are morally very egregious. I also agree that 
the reason for the failures is the bias of these societies’ democratic 
institutions towards the interests of their members.  But I am not sure of 
his thesis that the democratic institutions are inherently biased and 
incapable of pursuing in good faith the morally mandatory aims that 
constitute the global political community. I am not sure that we are looking 
at a fundamental truth about these institutions. The question, in my mind, 
is whether the citizens of these democratic societies must necessarily be 
devoted only (or almost only) to the interests of their fellow citizens. I don’t 
see in principle why the citizens of representative democracies cannot be 
concerned with the interests of those who are not in their societies. After 
all, citizens are concerned with the interests of distant other fellow citizens, 
partly because they must negotiate with them in the making of domestic 
law; I don’t think it is true that representatives merely represent the 
interests of citizens, they do represent those but they also represent the 
other regarding views of citizens as well, which views citizens are duty 
bound to promote in this context. Furthermore, there have been some 
important examples of such concern on the global level. Protests against 
the Vietnam War were partly motivated by these concerns. Additionally, 
there is a general consensus among citizens of wealthy states that 
development aid is a duty wealthy countries owe to poor countries. And 
there is some significant variety among developed countries in how much 
concern their peoples show for poverty outside their societies. Some 
countries give significantly above the .7 percent of GDP that is prescribed 
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by the Millennium Development Goals but most do not and the average is 
lower than the .7 percent (Center for Global Development 2013). There 
seems to be a correlation between the strength of the welfare state and the 
proportion of official development aid given. Some of this may reflect 
skepticism about the effectiveness of aid. The idea that there is an inherent 
bias is not born out by what we see.
Still, the amount of development assistance is low, and there are many 
other indicators that the concerns citizens show for their fellow human 
beings is on average low, so we must wonder how that can be increased. 
Part of the problem may be rectified if the international community puts 
more pressure on recalcitrant states. And part of the problem may be 
resolved if greater fairness in the process of negotiation among states is 
achieved. If we think that part of the explanation for why citizens care 
about other distant fellow citizens is that they are forced to deal with them 
in a democratic system, the same may hold between persons of wealthy 
states and those of developing states when developed states are required to 
deal with developing states in a fairer way.  
Some argue that a global education program could play a useful role. 
Alvarez suggests that there ought to be global deliberative assemblies that 
can bring these issues to the fore. But it seems to me that we already have 
these in the United Nations. There are a variety of UN institutions that 
engage in deliberation regarding the duties of states. The General Assembly, 
the Security Council, the various human rights treaty bodies, the 
conference of parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change are some of the deliberative bodies that give directives to 
states and put soft pressure on them to do more to cooperate in pursuit of 
the mandatory aims.  I am open to the idea that these can be improved. 
And there is no reason why the deliberative bodies must be confined to the 
United Nations bodies. The conferences of the World Trade Organization 
also play a role. And I think global civil society can play a role here in 
enhancing the deliberative activities of these bodies. And, of course, states 
can attempt by themselves or with others to persuade and pressure other 
states into playing more positive roles in cooperation. Though here there is 
a danger of a kind of neo-imperial imposition on the part of powerful 
states. I have not developed a complete account of the necessary 
institutional structures necessary to promote effective deliberation in this 
regard and I think this is an important avenue for the development of 
international cooperation.  However, I do think that the system is likely to 
remain fragmented as it is now.
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Alvarez suggests that there ought to be devices that correct for 
excessively low support for development assistance in the world as a whole, 
much like there are constitutional limits on what democratic assemblies 
can do. I agree with this and this is part of the conception of the international 
political system that I have proposed. I have argued that certain kinds of 
refusal of consent may be countered by pressure or even coercion when the 
refusal of consent is based on unscrupulous or irrational grounds. I think 
this serves roughly the same kind of function in the international system 
as a kind of constitutional limitation in a domestic system. We may hope 
that global concern will grow over time and that what we are observing is 
a lag effect of the fact that societies have not been focused on international 
relations other than war until relatively recently. But I have not made any 
recommendations about what kinds of institutions would be desirable 
here. This is an area that is very important but it is not one that I am 
prepared to make clear recommendations on at the moment.
David Lefkowitz’s comments press a number of important points. He 
argues that global democracy is not required because the conditions in the 
world at present do not require peoples to submit to a common legal order 
in order to treat each other justly. I am not sure how we are to evaluate that 
claim, but I have argued that the present global system already presents us 
with a distinctive type of political system. It is a political system whose 
decision making is primarily decentralized for reasons I have given above. 
But it is a political system because there are certain morally mandatory 
aims (such as the maintenance of international peace and security, the 
protection of persons from widespread human rights abuses, the alleviation 
of global poverty, the avoidance of global environmental disaster as well as 
the creation of a decent trade regime), which all, or nearly all, states 
recognize as requiring cooperation to pursue and which all states are duty 
bound to pursue. Questions of how to pursue these aims effectively and 
fairly together arise because there is uncertainty, disagreement, and 
conflict over how these should be pursued. The states need then to have a 
method for decision making in order to resolve these differences in trying 
to determine how to cooperate in pursuing the mandatory aims. Thus we 
have a political system. Not all the mandatory aims need be seen as 
concerns of justice and not all concerns of justice are taken as mandatory 
for this political system. There are many inequalities, which I regard as 
unjust, that cannot be dealt with by the global system at present and won’t 
be soluble by the system for a long time. The aims that I have posited are 
ones that almost all states have signed on to but are themselves very 
difficult to bring about as it is. They present a pretty thin but nevertheless 
quite challenging set of aims for the international community. 
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So there are moral reasons for cooperation but I have argued that the 
decision making leading to that cooperation ought to be a decentralized 
process of decision making with a qualified requirement of state consent. 
This is because of the centrality of states in bringing about the most basic 
goods for people and the consequent need to respect the integrity of those 
states. It is also because states have developed sophisticated and reasonably 
successful social systems for making power accountable to people and it is 
important to build on these systems that we should continue to use states 
as pillars of the system. Also the need for experimentation with different 
methods of achieving the aims gives us reason to think that states should 
be permitted to refuse consent to arrangements if they reasonably dissent 
from them and they have reasonable alternatives to offer. I also think that 
given the greatly different stakes states have in the decision making, the 
usual centralized egalitarian methods of decision making seem 
inappropriate since power ought to be proportionate to stakes.  
Lefkowitz takes me to task for neglecting instrumental grounds of 
legitimate authority but I have generally argued that there can be 
instrumental grounds of legitimate authority as well as legitimate authority 
that is grounded in considerations of intrinsic justice. Indeed, I think that 
in order to explain the authority of courts and bureaucracies in domestic 
democratic societies we have to appeal in part to their instrumental 
importance in realizing democratically chosen aims. And I agree that 
political institutions may have instrumentally grounded legitimate 
authority even if there is no inherent political authority to back it up. I 
simply think this is a more weakly grounded and tenuous form of authority. 
I focus on issues of democratic legitimacy because I think that it is an 
interesting question to determine if a system of state consent can, when 
suitably modified, live up to cosmopolitan and democratic norms. My only 
concern with the very interesting discussion of Keohane and Buchanan 
(2006) is that they do not explain how content independent reasons for 
action are generated by the institutions that satisfy the kinds of desirable 
properties they describe. The fact that an institution realizes or brings 
about desirable states of affairs does not help us determine whether we 
have content independent reasons to do as it tells us or merely just content 
dependent reasons to do as they tell us to do. If the institution tends to do 
good things, what is wrong with only acting as it tells us when it tells us to 
do good things? This is the central question that a theory of authority must 
answer and they do not answer it. But I do not reject the idea that some 
institutions may have some form of instrumentally grounded legitimate 
authority.
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The one instrumental approach that directly takes on this challenge is 
the normal justification thesis defended by Joseph Raz. According to this 
thesis, the normal and primary way to show that A has justified authority 
over B involves showing that when B takes A’s directives as authoritative (as 
content independent and exclusionary reasons for action) B acts better in 
accordance with the reasons that apply directly to her, that is, reasons 
independent of the authority’s directive (Raz 1990). So I act better in 
accordance with the reasons of justice and fairness that apply to me, say, 
when I take the taxing authority’s directives as giving me content 
independent and exclusionary reasons. If I were not to so take the directives, 
in other words if I were to just follow my own judgment in each case, I 
would often act mistakenly and not do my fair share in supporting the 
relevant institution. This account does give us the right kind of idea but it 
is notoriously subject to counterexamples. The example I have used in the 
past is Bernard Williams’s case of a chemical scientist, George, who is an 
active opponent of the Nazi regime (Williams 1973). He is asked by the 
Nazis to run a chemical weapons factory.  George is deeply opposed to the 
Nazis having these weapons but he also knows that he is not nearly as good 
a scientist as other more committed Nazis. He agrees to run the factory 
and then takes the directives the Nazis give him as content independent 
and exclusionary reasons. The consequence of his doing so is that this 
slows down production. And he must take the directives as authoritative 
because only then will he effectively be able to remain in his position. So 
he acts better in accordance with the reasons that apply to him (slowing 
down the production of chemical weapons) by doing this. Nevertheless, 
the Nazi leaders are not justified authorities over George. Hence, the 
conditions of the normal justification thesis are satisfied but the authority 
is not justified (Christiano 2008; see also Darwall 2010). I do not mean to 
reject instrumentalist accounts generally with this counterexample. It is 
meant to show the difficulty of constructing a good instrumentalist 
account. 
There is another reason why I think it is of some significance to focus on 
the kind of high grade legitimacy that I do focus on. It is that a political 
system that satisfies this property is a moral community of equals in which 
each is treating the others as equals in a highly public way by taking the 
directives of that community as content independent and weighty reasons 
because they derive from their fellow citizens. Instrumentally grounded 
authority has an opacity and tenuousness to it since it is not grounded in 
the right of the authority but in the expected effects, about which there is 
significant controversy. The inherent democratic authority I attempt to 
explicate is grounded in the right of each to be treated publicly as an equal. 
When I obey it, I am directly and publicly treating my fellow citizens as 
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equals. And I owe this even when I disagree with the content of the 
directives. Hence the nature of the authority realizes the kind of moral 
community of equals that is not clearly present in instrumentally grounded 
authority.
Michael Blake’s comments go to the heart of what I am arguing. I am 
arguing that the international community constitutes a distinctive type of 
political community. I think Blake wants to argue that this is not so, which 
is why he wants to say that the obligations in the international community 
are more like the obligations I have in relation to the Sierra Club than in 
relation to the state. We also disagree on the nature of a political community. 
The picture of a political community that I am suggesting is that people are 
required to pursue certain mandatory aims in cooperation with each 
other. And in order to do this they have to make decisions in a way that 
negotiates a great deal of disagreement on how to do this as well as conflicts 
of interest on these issues. There are, in other words, certain moral aims 
that are given independent of the political community but which require 
cooperation among the members to achieve.  
A state is a community concerned with a particularly thick set of aims, 
centered around justice and the common good, where a great deal of 
coordination and cooperation are required to achieve these. In this sense, 
the duty to pay taxes is a kind of instantiation of the more general duty to 
do one’s fair share in pursuing the basic aims but this requires a bit more 
theorizing. There are moral requirements that determine how one is to 
decide how to pursue these aims and this is where democratic norms come 
into the picture. And so the idea is that in a just political community 
persons have rights to participate as equals in deciding on how to pursue 
the aims and what fair shares each must contribute to the pursuit of these 
aims. So the particular legal requirements of contribution that are chosen 
by a just political society are going to involve some kind of compromise 
among the participants to the extent that they disagree. Hence the duties 
to pay taxes will be determined by a shared sense of the basic aims of the 
community and compromises between the members to the extent that 
they have different views about how to pursue the aims fairly. 
I have argued that the international society is a kind of political society. 
It is not merely a society of voluntary participants. And the reason is that 
there are mandatory aims that everyone must pursue in cooperation with 
others, despite disagreement and conflict of interests. A world of voluntary 
societies is one in which it is not required to cooperate with others on a 
fixed set of aims. I regard the Sierra Club as pursuing desirable aims but I 
do not think that I am required to help them out. There are a lot of other 
goods that I may cooperate in producing and I have a significant amount of 
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discretion as to which goods I want to help promote. Voluntary associations 
tend to be composed of reasonably like minded people concerned to 
pursue aims they all recognize and they all agree on. Of course, as a citizen 
of a state I am required to do my part in achieving the mandatory aims the 
state must pursue. Political associations pursue moral aims but since 
cooperation is required, they experience the clash of different opinions 
and interests.
International society is a budding political society since all (or nearly 
all) the states in it recognize the necessity of cooperation in pursuit of 
certain morally mandatory aims such as peace and security, development, 
basic human rights protection, environmental protection, and decent 
trade. These aims are articulated in the major treaty bodies such as the 
Charter of the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Millennium 
Development Goals.  These are not merely voluntary clubs, they are 
organizations of states that self-consciously assert the moral necessity of 
cooperation and that are willing to engage in pressuring and even coercion 
of those who are failing to make any kind of good faith contribution. They 
derive their political authority from the fact that they have the consent of 
members to particular ways of pursuing mandatory aims. The decision 
making concerning these goals is decentralized to some significant degree 
so that consent is an important component but the requirement of consent 
is qualified, I think, in ways I outlined above.
I don’t think that the picture I am outlining requires that contributing 
political societies maximize the extent to which the morally mandatory 
aims are achieved. The extent to which a political society is required to 
contribute will itself be a matter of controversy. The Millennium 
Development declaration requires societies to give .7 percent of their GDP 
towards poverty alleviation. This is not the kind of requirement that 
involves maximization, though most states fail to achieve even this.  
Furthermore, I take it that the view I have defended implies a solution to 
the assurance problem Blake outlines. There is a remedy to the problem of 
societies being taken advantage of by free riders in the scheme I am 
proposing. First, the account asserts that pressure and sometimes even 
coercion can be applied on a recalcitrant state that is unscrupulous, 
irrational, self-defeating or otherwise fails to make a good faith effort to 
pursue the mandatory aims in cooperation with others. Second, societies 
are supposed to solve these problems by entering into explicit agreements 
with other societies, compliance with which can be monitored if the 
agreements provide for it. 
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I do agree with Blake that when all other societies are acting badly 
generally, there may be a permission to go it alone. I am not convinced we 
are in that situation now. The situation we are in now is that states recognize 
the requirement to cooperate to pursue mandatory aims but they are still 
falling short of the behavior they recognize as required. I take it as a kind 
of support for the approach I am proposing that it can be seen as a kind of 
moral and rational reconstruction of what states are already committed to, 
though they are clearly coming up short on these commitments. 
Furthermore, I think that the international community has made some 
serious progress in the development of international institutions. For all its 
flaws, the development of a more open system of international trade has 
played a role in lessening inequality and bringing people out of poverty. 
The climate change regime has been making some progress towards 
limiting carbon emissions. The respect for the territorial integrity of 
societies has become an increasingly powerful norm of the international 
community. There has been some progress in realizing democracy 
throughout the world. I think that there is at least a reasonable hope that 
the peoples of the world will continue to make progress on these issues 
through the modern system of state consent.
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